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Abstract. What You See Is Not What You eXecute: computers do not execute source-code
programs; they execute machine-code programs that are generated from source code. Not
only can the WYSINWYX phenomenon create a mismatch between what a programmer
intends and what is actually executed by the processor, it can cause analyses that are per-
formed on source code to fail to detect certain bugs and vulnerabilities. This issue arises
regardless of whether one’s favorite approach to assuring that programs behave as desired
is based on theorem proving, model checking, or abstract interpretation.
1 Introduction
Recent research in programming languages, software engineering, and computer secu-
rityhas led to newkindsoftools foranalyzingcodeforbugsandsecurityvulnerabilities
[23,39,18,12,8,4,9,25,15]. In these tools, static analysis is used to determine a con-
servative answer to the question “Can the program reach a bad state?”3 However, these
tools all focus on analyzing source code written in a high-level language, which has
certain drawbacks. In particular, there can be a mismatch between what a programmer
intends and what is actually executed by the processor. Consequently, analyses that are
performed on source code can fail to detect certain bugs and vulnerabilities due to the
WYSINWYX phenomenon:“What You See Is Not What You eXecute”. The following
source-code fragment, taken from a login program, illustrates the issue [27]:
memset(password, ‘
￿ 0’, len);
free(password);
The login program temporarily stores the user’s password—in clear text—in a dynam-
ically allocated buffer pointed to by the pointer variable password. To minimize the
lifetimeofthepassword,whichissensitiveinformation,thecodefragmentshownabove
zeroes-out the buffer pointedto by password before returningit to the heap. Unfortu-
nately, a compiler that performs useless-code elimination may reason that the program
never uses the values written by the call on memset, and therefore the call on memset
can be removed—thereby leaving sensitive information exposed in the heap. This is
not just hypothetical; a similar vulnerability was discovered during the Windows secu-
rity push in 2002 [27]. This vulnerability is invisible in the source code; it can only be
detected by examining the low-level code emitted by the optimizing compiler.
The WYSINWYX phenomenon is not restricted to the presence or absence of pro-
cedure calls; on the contrary, it is pervasive:
– Bugs and security vulnerabilities can exist because of a myriadof platform-speciﬁc
details due to features (and idiosyncrasies) of compilers and optimizers, including
3 Static analysis provides a way to obtain information about the possible states that a pro-
gram reaches during execution, but without actually running the program on speciﬁc inputs.
Static-analysis techniques explore the program’s behavior for all possible inputs and all pos-
sible states that the program can reach. To make this feasible, the program is “run in the
aggregate”—i.e., on descriptors that represent collections of memory conﬁgurations [13].￿ memory-layoutdetails, such as (i) the positions (i.e., offsets) of variables in the
runtime stack’s activation records, and (ii) padding between structure ﬁelds.
￿ register usage
￿ execution order (e.g., of actual parameters)
￿ optimizations performed
￿ artifacts of compiler bugs
Access to such information can be crucial; for instance, many security exploits
depend on platform-speciﬁc features, such as the structure of activation records.
Vulnerabilities can escape notice when a tool does not have information about ad-
jacency relationships among variables.
– Analyses based on source code4 typically make (unchecked)assumptions, e.g.,that
the program is ANSI-C compliant. This often means that an analysis does not ac-
count for behaviors that are allowed by the compiler (e.g., arithmetic is performed
on pointers that are subsequently used for indirect function calls; pointers move off
the ends of arrays and are subsequently dereferenced; etc.)
– Programs typically make extensive use of libraries, including dynamically linked
libraries (DLLs), which may not be available in source-code form. Typically, anal-
yses are performedusing code stubs that model the effects of library calls. Because
these are created by hand they are likely to contain errors, which may cause an
analysis to return incorrect results.
– Programs are sometimes modiﬁed subsequent to compilation,e.g., to performopti-
mizations or insert instrumentation code [40]. (They may also be modiﬁed to insert
malicious code.) Such modiﬁcations are not visible to tools that analyze source.
– The source code may have been written in more than one language. This com-
plicates the life of designers of tools that analyze source code because multiple
languages must be supported, each with its own quirks.
– Even if the source code is primarily written in one high-level language, it may
contain inlined assembly code in selected places. Source-leveltools typically either
skip over inlined assembly code [11] or do not push the analysis beyond sites of
inlined assembly code [1].
In short, there are a number of reasons why analyses based on source code do not
provide the right level of detail for checking certain kinds of properties:
– Source-level tools are only applicable when source is available, which limits
their usefulness in security applications (e.g., to analyzing code from open-source
projects).
– Evenif sourcecodeis available,a substantialamountof informationis hiddenfrom
analyses that start from source code,which can cause bugs, security vulnerabilities,
and malicious behavior to be invisible to such tools. Moreover, a source-code tool
that strives to have greater ﬁdelity to the program that is actually executed would
have to duplicate all of the choices made by the compiler and optimizer; such an
approach is doomed to failure.
The issue of whether source code is the appropriate level for verifying program
properties is one that should concern all who are interested in assuring that programs
4 Terms like “analyses based on source code” and “source-level analyses” are used as a short-
hand for “analyses that work on intermediate representations (IRs) built from the source code.”
2behave as desired. The issues discussed abovearise regardless of whether one’s favorite
approach is based on theorem proving, model checking, or abstract interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
￿
2 presents some examples
that show why analysis of an executable can provide more accurate information than
a source-level analysis.
￿
3 discusses different approaches to analyzing executables.
￿
4
describes our work on CodeSurfer/x86, as an example of how it is possible to analyze
executables in the absence of source code.
2 Advantages of Analyzing Executables
The example presented in
￿
1 showed that an overzealous optimizer can cause there to
be a mismatch between what a programmer intends and what is actually executed by
the processor. Additional examples of this sort have been discussed by Boehm [5]. He
points out that when threads are implemented as a library (e.g., for use in languages
such as C and C++, where threads are not part of the language speciﬁcation), compiler
transformations that are reasonable in the absence of threads can cause multi-threaded
code to fail—or exhibit unexpected behavior—for subtle reasons that are not visible to
tools that analyze source code.
A second class of examples for which analysis of an executable can provide more
accurate information than a source-level analysis arises because, for many program-
ming languages, certain behaviors are left unspeciﬁed by the semantics. In such cases,
a source-level analysis must account for all possible behaviors, whereas an analysis
of an executable generally only has to deal with one possible behavior—namely, the
one for the code sequence chosen by the compiler. For instance, in C and C++ the or-
der in which actual parameters are evaluated is not speciﬁed: actuals may be evaluated
left-to-right, right-to-left, or in some other order; a compiler could even use different
evaluationorders fordifferentfunctions.Differentevaluationorderscan giverise to dif-
ferent behaviors when actual parameters are expressions that contain side effects. For a
source-level analysis to be sound, at each call site it must take the join of the abstract
descriptors that result from analyzing each permutation of the actuals. In contrast, an
analysis of an executable only needs to analyze the particular sequence of instructions
that lead up to the call.
A second example in this class involves pointer arithmetic and an indirect call:
int (*f)(void);
int diff = (char*)&f2 - (char*)&f1; // The offset between f1 and f2
f = &f1;
f = (int (*)())((char*)f + diff); // f now points to f2
(*f)(); // indirect call;
Existing source-level analyses (that we know of) are ill-prepared to handle the above
code. The conventional assumption is that arithmetic on function pointers leads to un-
deﬁned behavior, so source-level analyses either (a) assume that the indirect function
call might call any function, or (b) ignore the arithmetic operations and assume that the
indirect function call calls f1 (on the assumption that the code is ANSI-C compliant).
In contrast, the analysis described by Balakrishnan and Reps [3] correctly identiﬁes f2
as the invoked function. Furthermore, the analysis can detect when arithmetic on ad-
dresses creates an address that does not point to the beginning of a function; the use of
3such an address to perform a function “call” is likely to be a bug (or else a very subtle,
deliberately introduced security vulnerability).
A third example related to unspeciﬁed behavior is shown in Fig. 1. The C code on
the left uses an uninitialized variable (which triggers a compiler warning, but compiles
successfully). A source-code analyzer must assume that local can have any value,
and therefore the value of v in main is either 1 or 2. The assembly listings on the
right show how the C code could be compiled, including two variants for the prolog of
function callee. The Microsoft compiler (cl) uses the second variant, which includes
the following strength reduction:
The instruction sub esp,4 that allocates space for local is replaced by
a push instruction of an arbitrary register (in this case, ecx).
In contrast to an analysis based on source code, an analysis of an executable can deter-
mine that this optimization results in local being initialized to 5, and therefore v in
main can only have the value 1.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿
￿
￿ ￿￿ "￿￿#$￿￿￿%&’￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ "￿￿#$￿￿￿%(’￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿"￿￿#$￿￿￿%(’
#￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿"￿￿#$￿￿￿%&’
#￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿%￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
* ￿* ￿*
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# #￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿#
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿#
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)
Fig.1. Example of unexpected behavior due to compiler
optimization. The box at the top right shows two variants
of code generated by an optimizing compiler for the pro-
log of callee. Analysis of the second of these reveals
that the variable local necessarily contains the value 5.
A fourth example re-
lated to unspeciﬁed be-
havior involves a function
call that passes fewer ar-
guments than the proce-
dure expects as parame-
ters. (Many compilers ac-
cept such (unsafe) code as
an easy way to implement
functions that take a vari-
able number of parame-
ters.) With most compilers,
this effectively means that
the call-site passes some
parts of one or more lo-
cal variables of the calling
procedure as the remaining
parameters (and, in effect,
these are passed by reference—an assignment to such a parameter in the callee will
overwrite the value of the corresponding local in the caller.) An analysis that works on
executables can be created that is capable of determining what the extra parameters are
[3], whereas a source-level analysis must either make a cruder over-approximation or
an unsound under-approximation.
3 Approaches to Analyzing Executables
The examples in
￿
2 illustrate some of the advantages of analyzing executables instead
of source code: an executable contains the actual instructions that will be executed,
and hence reveals more accurate information about the behaviors that might occur dur-
ing execution; an analysis can incorporate platform-speciﬁc details, including memory
layout, register usage, execution order, optimizations, and artifacts of compiler bugs.
Moreover,manyofthe issues thatarise when analyzingsourcecodedisappearwhen
analyzing executables:
4– The entire program can be analyzed—includinglibraries that are linked to the pro-
gram. Because library code can be analyzed directly, it is not necessary to rely on
potentially unsound models of library functions.
– If an executable has been modiﬁed subsequent to compilation, such modiﬁcations
are visible to the analysis tool.
– Source code does not have to be available.
– Even if the source code was written in more than one language, a tool that analyzes
executables only needs to support one language.
– Instructions inserted because of inlined assembly directives in the source code are
visible, and do not need to be treated any differently than other instructions.
The challenge is to build tools that can beneﬁt from these advantages to provide a level
of precision that would not otherwise be possible.
Onedichotomyforclassifyingapproachesis whetherthe toolassumes thatinforma-
tion is available in addition to the executable itself—such as the source code, symbol-
table information,and debugginginformation.For instance, the aim of translation vali-
dation[32,31]is to verifythat compilationdoes notchangethe semantics of a program.
A translation-validation system receives the source code and target code as input, and
attempts to verify that the target code is a correct implementation (i.e., a reﬁnement)
of the source code. Rival [35] presents an analysis that uses abstract interpretation to
check whether the assembly code produced by a compiler possesses the same safety
properties as the original source code. The analysis assumes that both source code and
debugging information is available. First, the source code and the assembly code of
the program are analyzed. Next, the debugging information is used to map the results
of assembly-code analysis back to the source code. If the results for the correspond-
ing program points in the source code and the assembly code are compatible, then the
assembly code possesses the same safety properties as the source code.
4 Analyzing Executables in the Absence of Source Code
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Fig.2.OrganizationofCodeSurfer/x86andcompaniontools.
For the past few years,
we have been work-
ing to create a platform
to support the analy-
sis of executables in
the absence of source
code. The goal of the
work is to extend static
vulnerability-analysistech-
niques to work directly
on strippedexecutables.
We have developed a
prototype tool set for
analyzing x86 executa-
bles. The members of
the tool set are: CodeSurfer/x86, WPDS++, and the Path Inspector. Fig. 2 shows how
the components of CodeSurfer/x86 ﬁt together.
5Recovering IRs from x86 executables. To be able to apply analysis techniques like
the ones used in [23,39,18,12,8,4,9,25,15], one already encounters a challenging
program-analysis problem. From the perspective of the model-checking community,
one would consider the problem to be that of “model extraction”: one needs to extract
a suitable model from the executable.From the perspective of the compiler community,
one would consider the problem to be “IR recovery”:one needs to recoverintermediate
representationsfrom the executablethat are similar to those that would be available had
one started from source code.
To solve the IR-recovery problem, several obstacles must be overcome:
– For many kinds of potentially malicious programs, symbol-table and debugging
information is entirely absent. Even if it is present, it cannot be relied upon.
– To understand memory-access operations, it is necessary to determine the set of
addresses accessed by each operation. This is difﬁcult because
￿ While some memory operations use explicit memory addresses in the instruc-
tion (easy), others use indirect addressing via address expressions (difﬁcult).
￿ Arithmetic on addresses is pervasive. For instance, even when the value of a
local variable is loaded from its slot in an activation record, address arithmetic
is performed.
￿ There is no notion of type at the hardware level, so address values cannot be
distinguished from integer values.
To recover IRs from x86 executables, CodeSurfer/x86 makes use of both IDAPro
[28], a disassembly toolkit, and GrammaTech’s CodeSurfer system [11], a toolkit for
building program-analysis and inspection tools.
An x86 executable is ﬁrst disassembled using IDAPro. In addition to the disassem-
bly listing, IDAPro also provides access to the following information: (1) procedure
boundaries, (2) calls to library functions, and (3) statically known memory addresses
and offsets. IDAPro provides access to its internal resources via an API that allows
users to create plug-ins to be executed by IDAPro. We created a plug-in to IDAPro,
called the Connector, that creates data structures to represent the information that it ob-
tains from IDAPro. The IDAPro/Connector combination is also able to create the same
data structures for dynamicallylinked libraries, and to link them into the data structures
that represent the program itself. This infrastructure permits whole-programanalysis to
be carried out—including analysis of the code for all library functions that are called.
Using the data structures in the Connector, we implemented a static-analysis al-
gorithm called value-set analysis (VSA) [3]. VSA does not assume the presence of
symbol-tableordebugginginformation.Hence,asaﬁrststep,aset ofdataobjectscalled
a-locs (for“abstract locations”)is determinedbasedonthe static memoryaddressesand
offsetsprovidedbyIDAPro.VSAisacombinednumericandpointer-analysisalgorithm
that determines an over-approximation of the set of numeric values and addresses (or
value-set) that each a-loc holds at each program point.5 A key feature of VSA is that it
tracks integer-valued and address-valued quantities simultaneously. This is crucial for
analyzing executables because numeric values and addresses are indistinguishable at
execution time.
5 VSA is a ﬂow-sensitive, interprocedural dataﬂow-analysis algorithm that uses the “call-
strings” approach [38] to obtain a degree of context sensitivity.
6IDAPro does not identify the targets of all indirect jumps and indirect calls, and
therefore the call graph and control-ﬂow graphs that it constructs are not complete.
However, the information computed during VSA can be used to augment the call graph
and control-ﬂow graphs on-the-ﬂy to account for indirect jumps and indirect calls.
VSA also checks whether the executable conforms to a “standard” compilation
model—i.e., a runtime stack is maintained; activation records are pushed onto the stack
on procedure entry and popped from the stack on procedure exit; a procedure does not
modify the return address on stack; the program’s instructions occupy a ﬁxed area of
memory, are not self-modifying, and are separate from the program’s data. If it can-
not be conﬁrmed that the executable conforms to the model, then the IR is possibly
incorrect. For example, the call-graph can be incorrect if a procedure modiﬁes the re-
turn address on the stack. Consequently, VSA issues an error report whenever it ﬁnds a
possible violationof the standardcompilationmodel; these represent possible memory-
safety violations. The analyst can go over these reports and determine whether they are
false alarms or real violations.
Once VSA completes,the value-setsfor the a-locs at each programpointare used to
determine each point’s sets of used, killed, and possibly-killed a-locs; these are emitted
in a format that is suitable for input to CodeSurfer. CodeSurfer then builds a collection
of IRs, consisting of abstract-syntax trees, control-ﬂow graphs (CFGs), a call graph, a
systemdependencegraph(SDG)[26],VSA results,thesets ofused,killed,andpossibly
killeda-locsat eachinstruction,andinformationaboutthestructureandlayoutofglobal
memory, activation records, and dynamically allocated storage. CodeSurfer supports
both a graphical user interface (GUI) and an API (as well as a scripting language) to
provide access to these structures.
Model-checking facilities. For model checking, the CodeSurfer/x86 IRs are used to
build a weighted pushdown system (WPDS) [7,33,34,30] that models possible pro-
gram behaviors. Weighted pushdown systems generalize a model-checking technology
known as pushdown systems (PDSs) [6,19], which have been used for software model
checking in the Moped [37,36] and MOPS [9] systems. Compared to ordinary (un-
weighted) PDSs, WPDSs are capable of representing more powerful kinds of abstrac-
tions of runtime states [34,30], and hence go beyond the capabilities of PDSs. For
instance, the use of WPDSs provides a way to address certain kinds of security-related
queries that cannot be answered by MOPS.
WPDS++ [29] is a library that implements the symbolic reachability algorithms
from [34,30] on weighted pushdown systems. We follow the standard approach of us-
ing a pushdown system (PDS) to model the interprocedural control-ﬂow graph (one of
CodeSurfer/x86’s IRs). The stack symbols correspond to program locations; there is
only a single PDS state; and PDS rules encode control ﬂow as follows:
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In a conﬁgurationof the PDS, the symbol at the top of the stack corresponds to the cur-
rent program location, and the rest of the stack holds return-site locations—this allows
the PDS to model the behavior of the program’s runtime execution stack.
7An encoding of the interproceduralcontrol-ﬂow as a pushdown system is sufﬁcient
for answering queries about reachable control states (as the Path Inspector does; see
below): the reachability algorithms of WPDS++ can determine if an undesirable PDS
conﬁgurationis reachable.However,WPDS++ also supportsweighted PDSs, which are
PDSs in which each rule is weighted with an element of a (user-deﬁned) semiring. The
use of weights allows WPDS++ to perform interprocedural dataﬂow analysis by using
the semiring’s extend operator to compute weights for sequences of rule ﬁrings and
usingthesemiring’scombineoperatortotakethemeetofweightsgeneratedbydifferent
paths [34,30]. (When the weights on rules are conservative abstract data transformers,
anover-approximationtothesetofreachableconcreteconﬁgurationsis obtained,which
means that counterexamples reported by WPDS++ may actually be infeasible.)
The advantage of answering reachability queries on WPDSs over conventional
dataﬂow-analysis methods is that the latter merge together the values for all states as-
sociated with the same program point, regardless of the states’ calling context. With
WPDSs, queries can be posed with respect to a regularlanguageof stack conﬁgurations
[7,33,34,30]. (Conventional merged dataﬂow information can also be obtained [34].)
The Path Inspector provides a user interface for automating safety queries that are
only concerned with the possible control conﬁgurations that an executable can reach.
It uses an automaton-based approach to model checking: the query is speciﬁed as a
ﬁnite automaton that captures forbidden sequences of program locations. This “query
automaton” is combined with the program model (a WPDS) using a cross-productcon-
struction, and the reachability algorithms of WPDS++ are used to determine if an error
conﬁguration is reachable. If an error conﬁguration is reachable, then witnesses (see
[34]) can be used to producea program path that drives the query automaton to an error
state.
The Path Inspector includes a GUI for instantiating many common reachability
queries [17], and for displaying counterexample paths in the disassembly listing.6 In
the current implementation, transitions in the query automaton are triggered by pro-
gram points that the user speciﬁes either manually,or using result sets from CodeSurfer
queries. Futureversions of the Path Inspectorwill supportmore sophisticated queriesin
which transitions are triggered by matching an AST pattern against a program location,
and query states can be instantiated based on pattern bindings.
Related work. Previous work on analyzing memory accesses in executables has dealt
with memory accesses very conservatively: generally, if a register is assigned a value
from memory, it is assumed to take on any value. VSA does a much better job than
previous work because it tracks the integer-valued and address-valued quantities that
the program’s data objects can hold; in particular, VSA tracks the values of data objects
other than just the hardware registers, and thus is not forced to give up all precision
when a load from memory is encountered.
6 We assume that source code is not available, but the techniques extend naturally if it is: one
can treat the executable code as just another IR in the collection of IRs obtainable from source
code. The mapping of information back to the source code would be similar to what C source-
code tools already have to perform because of the use of the C preprocessor (although the kind
of issues that arise when debugging optimized code [24,42,14] complicate matters).
8The basic goal of the algorithm proposed by Debray et al. [16] is similar to that
of VSA: for them, it is to ﬁnd an over-approximation of the set of values that each
register can hold at each program point; for us, it is to ﬁnd an over-approximation of
the set of values that each (abstract) data object can hold at each program point, where
data objects include memory locations in addition to registers. In their analysis, a set of
addresses is approximated by a set of congruence values: they keep track of only the
low-order bits of addresses. However, unlike VSA, their algorithm does not make any
effort to track values that are not in registers. Consequently, they lose a great deal of
precision whenever there is a load from memory.
Cifuentes and Fraboulet [10] give an algorithm to identify an intraprocedural slice
of an executable by following the program’s use-def chains. However, their algorithm
also makes no attempt to track values that are not in registers, and hence cuts short the
slice when a load from memory is encountered.
The two pieces of work that are most closely related to VSA are the algorithm for
data-dependence analysis of assembly code of Amme et al. [2] and the algorithm for
pointer analysis on a low-level intermediate representation of Guo et al. [22]. The al-
gorithm of Amme et al. performs only an intraprocedural analysis, and it is not clear
whether the algorithm fully accounts for dependences between memory locations. The
algorithm of Guo et al. [22] is only partially ﬂow-sensitive: it tracks registers in a ﬂow-
sensitive manner, but treats memory locations in a ﬂow-insensitive manner. The al-
gorithm uses partial transfer functions [41] to achieve context-sensitivity. The transfer
functionsare parameterizedby“unknowninitial values”(UIVs); however,it is not clear
whether the the algorithm accounts for the possibility of called procedures corrupting
the memory locations that the UIVs represent.
Challenges for the future. There are a number of challenging problems for which
additional research is needed. Most of these are similar to the challenges one faces
when analyzing source code:
– efﬁciency and scalability of analysis algorithms, including how to create summary
transformers for procedures
– accounting for non-local transfers of control (e.g., setjmp/longjmp and C++
exception handling)
– analysis of variable-argumentfunctions
– analysis of multi-threaded code
– analysis of heap-allocated data structures
As with source-code analysis, it would be useful to develop specialized analyses for
particular kinds of data or particular programming idioms, including
– how strings are used in the program
– the “macro-level”effects of loops that performarray operations (e.g., that an array-
initialization loop initializes all elements of an array [21])
– the effects of loops that perform sentinel search
– analysis of self-modifying code [20]
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